

# '56 EAST EUROPE PLAN OF C.I.A. IS DESCRIBED

Ex-Aide Says Units Were Trained  
to Return for Risings Spurred by  
Disclosure of Khrushchev Talks

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WASHINGTON, Nov. 29—A former chief of covert operations for the Central Intelligence Agency says that the United States gave paramilitary training to Eastern European volunteers for intervention in potential national uprisings in Hungary, Poland and Rumania in 1956.

James Angleton, head of special operations and counterintelligence in 1956, said in an interview that the agency began training hundreds of Eastern Europeans after one of his operatives obtained a text of the secret speech in which Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956.

Mr. Angleton, who retired from the C.I.A. last year, maintained that his motive was to "balance out" an account of the C.I.A.'s handling of the speech published by Ray S. Cline, then a top-ranking intelligence analyst at the agency. Mr. Cline, who was in charge of Chinese-Soviet affairs in the Office of Current Intelligence and later became deputy C.I.A. director before going on to the State Department, included the account in his newly issued autobiography, "Secrets, Spies and Scholars." "There Was No Payment," Mr. Angleton, in presenting his account, said.

## "There Was No Payment"

Mr. Angleton, in presenting his account, said that soon after the Khrushchev speech became known in the West, the then Director, Allen W. Dulles, ordered him to obtain a copy as a matter of the highest priority. A covert agent acquired the text in April 1956 from a European Communist whose motive for handing it over was said to be ideological. "There was no payment," Mr. Angleton added, disputing Mr. Cline's assertion that the agency had paid "a very handsome price."

He said his superior, the late Frank G. Wisner, then director of clandestine services, including covert operations, perceived the speech as a tool for fostering nationalist opposition to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.

"Having the document gave us enormous advantage to organize and update those operational groups which were authorized in 1950," he continued, referring to a directive that established the agency's covert political-action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination, with an authorization for paramilitary operational groups to be used "with a view of never accepting the status quo of Soviet hegemony."

Mr. Wisner, who had been recommended by Gen. George C. Marshall to head the covert action program, and Mr. Angleton promoted "vast preparations for refurbishing operational groups," anticipating that the Khrushchev speech "would be a thunderbolt not only to the international Communist movement, but to sovereign Communist states," Mr. Angleton related.

## Trained in West Germany

The Eastern Europeans, in part former members of prewar peasant parties and largely from Hungary, Poland and Rumania, with some from Czechoslovakia, were trained at a secret installation in West Germany by C.I.A. paramilitary specialists, he said. He added that the units were headed by a man he described as "a born leader, a Yugoslav, whose schooling was in the Hapsburg military academy."

Mr. Angleton said the units were disbanded in 1958, causing great disillusion and bitterness among the members.

The strategy developed by C.I.A.'s clandestine services, principally by Mr. Wisner, he said, envisioned keeping American acquisition of the Khrushchev speech secret until the covert groups were "up to snuff" and then releasing it to provoke national uprisings. He acknowledged that the strategy was in harmony with a concept, frequently articulated when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State, that the United States had a duty to "roll back" Communist forces that had seized control in Eastern Europe in the wake of World War II.

The handling of the Khrushchev speech became a hotly debated topic in the inner circles of the Eisenhower Administration, as Mr. Cline relates in his book.

## Cline Reports Amazement

"There were many talks about what to do," Mr. Angleton recalled. In the Cline account, Mr. Wisner and Mr. Angleton, to Mr. Cline's amazement, opposed publication of the speech, which he had advanced as treating the world to "the spectacle of a totalitarian nation indicted by its own leadership."

"Cline's role was only verification of the document," Mr. Angleton commented. "He wasn't a party to the discussions on the clandestine side."

In Mr. Cline's version, he prevailed, and on June 2, 1956, Allen Dulles telephoned his brother to say that the speech should be released.

In Mr. Angleton's account it went this way: "The decision to publish the Khrush-

chev speech was made by Eisenhower, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles. They decided its significance should take precedence over political action, and therefore, with the President's consent, the text and footnotes prepared by the C.I.A. were given over to The New York Times."

Mr. Angleton said that in his view what he termed premature release of the speech, which The Times published on June 4, 1956, provoked nationalist risings in Poland, Hungary and Rumania too soon for the covert operational groups to respond.

Mr. Cline and Mr. Angleton were agreed in opposing the policy of East-West détente furthered by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger under President Richard M. Nixon and President Ford.

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